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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
VIRGIL S. REDMOND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
10610 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Virgil S. Redmond, appeals from 
a conviction on jury trial for the crime of uttering a 
fictitious check in the Third Judicial District for Salt 
Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with uttering a fic-
titious check. Prior to trial a motion for the produc-
tion of certain checks in the possession of the police 
was made by appellant. The trial court denied the 
motion for production. The jury returned a verdict 
of guilty to the charge of uttering a fictitious check, 
2 
and the appellant was sentenced to a term in the 
Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of 
facts. 
The appellant was charged with the crime of is· 
suing a fictitious check in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-26-7 (1953). The amended information 
stated that appellant "with intent to defraud ... did 
utter a fictitious check purporting to be an instru-
ment in writing for the payment of money of CARL. 
J. COON, and there was then and there no such per-
son as CARL I. COON, in existence," the appellant 
then and there knowing the said instrument to be 
fictitious (R. l ). 
Respondent accepts as factual the statement of 
facts presented by appellant as to the proceedings 
prior to trial. Appellant had demanded access to 
checks then allegedly in the hands of the County 
Attorney. This court affirmed the decision of the Dis-
trict Court in denying such access in Redmond v. 
City Court, 17 Utah 2d 95, 404 P.2d 964 (1965). 
Appellant again demanded access to these 
checks in a request for a bill of particulars in the 
3 
Third District Court (R. 2). The court ruled that evi-
dence concerning checks other than the one 
charged in the information was not material to the 
issue in the case (R. 617). The court also denied ap-
pellant's motion for such access at the commence-
ment of trial (R. 625), in his motion for a continuance 
(R. 358), and his motion for a new trial (R. 358). Ap-
pellant admitted ample opportunity was available 
to see the specific check in question (R. 624) and 
that he had in fact had such a copy in his possession. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AP-
PELLANT ACCESS TO CHECKS IN THE POSSESSION 
OF THE PROSECUTION SINCE: 
A. DUE PROCESS DOES NOT COMPEL PRO-
DUCTION OF THE INFORMATION REQUEST-
ED. 
B. CRIMINAL DISCOVERY PROCEDURES DO 
NOT REQUIRE SUCH PRODUCTION. 
The appellant's contention that the denial of ac-
cess to the requested checks is a violation of due 
process of law is without merit. The information sup-
plied by the prosecution amply apprises the appel-
lant of the charge against him. There is no dispute as 
to the check in question; the prosecution was based 
only on this single check. In Leland v. Oreqon, 343 
U.S. 790 (1952), the United States Supreme Court 
passed on the refusal of a state trial court to require 
4 
the district attorney to make available to defendant 
his confession to the crime charged. Also, in Cicenia 
v. LaGay. 357 U.S. 504 (1958), the same issue was con-
sidered by the United States Supreme Court and the 
contention was again rejected. The Court observed, 
357 U.S. at 510: 
... He argues that he was deprived of due process 
because New Jersey required him to plead to the in-
dictment for murder without the opportunity to in-
spect his confession. 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not reach so far. 
As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
the earlier proceedings in this case, 6 N.J. 296, 299-
301, 78 A.2d 568 at 570, 571, the rule in that State 
is that the trial judge has discretion whether or not 
to allow inspection before trial. This is consistent 
with the practice in many other jurisdictions. See, 
e.g., State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647; People 
v. Skoyec, 183 Wisc. 764, 50 NYS 2d 438; State v. 
Clark, 21 Wash.2d 774, 153 P.2d 297. In Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801, 802, 96 L. ed. 1302, 1311, 
72 St. Ct. 1002, this Court held that in the absence 
of a showing of prejudice to the defendant it was not 
a violation of due process for a state to deny counsel 
an opportunity before trial to inspect his client's 
confession. It is true that in Leland the confession 
was made available to the defense at the trial several 
days before its case was rested, whereas here the 
petitioner pleaded non vult without an opportunity 
to see the confession. We think that the principle of 
that case is nonetheless applicable. As was said in 
Leland (343 U.S. 801), although it may be the 
'better practice' for the prosecution to comply with 
a request for inspection, we cannot say that the dis-
5 
cretionary refusal of the trial judge to permit in-
spection in this case offended the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
In People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y. 2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 
881 (1961), the appellant contended that he was de-
nied due process of law and, in addition, that it was 
error for the trial judge to refuse to turn over to de-
fense counsel statements given before trial by three 
prosecution witnesses. The New York Court of Ar;-
peals rejected the argument and affirmed the con-
viction. See also People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme 
Court. 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927), where Justica 
Cardozo ruled that there was no requirement for 
general discovery by the defendant in a criminal 
case. Some courts have felt that this constitutes the 
work product of the prosecuting attorney. State v. 
Bunk. 63 A.2d 842, 845 (N.J. 1949). 
One of the most instructive opm1ons on the 
question of whether or not liberal discovery in crim-
inal cases should be allowed was rendered in State 
v. Tune. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), by Chief 
Justice Vanderbilt, long a supporter of law reform. 
He stated, 98 A.2d at 884: 
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught 
the courts that often discovery will lead not to honest 
fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and the 
suppression of evidence. Thus the criminal who is 
aware of the whole case against him will of ten pro-
cure perjured testimony in order to set up a false 
defense ... Another result of full discovery would be 
that the criminal defendant who is informed of the 
6 
names of all the State's witnesses may take steps to 
bribe or to frighten them into giving perjured test-
imony or into absenting themselves so that they are 
unavailable to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if 
they know that the defendant will have knowledge 
of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come 
forward with information during the investigation of 
the crime . . .. All these dangers are more inherent 
in criminal proceedings where the defendant has 
much more at stake, often his own life, than in civil 
proceedings. The presence of perjury in criminal pro-
ceedings today is extensive despite the efforts of the 
courts to eradicate it and it constitutes a very seriou5 
threat to the administration of criminal justice and 
thus to the welfare of the country as a whole .... To 
permit unqualified disclosure of all statements and 
information in the hands of the State would go far be-
yond what is required in civil cases; it would defeat the 
very ends of justice. 
In considering the problem it must be remembered 
that in view of the defendant's constitutional and 
statutory protections against self-incrimination, the 
State has no right whatsoever to demand an inspect-
ion of any of his documents or to take his deposition, 
or to submit interrogatories to him. 
Except for its right to demand particulars from the 
defendant as to any alibi on which he intends to rely, 
Rule 2:5-7, the State is completely at the mercy of 
the defendant who can produce surprise evidence at 
the trial can take the stand or not as he wishes, and ' . 
generally can introduce any sort of unforseeable evi-
dence he desires in his own defense. To allow him to 
discover the prosecutor's whole case against him 
would be to make the prosecutor's task almost in-
surmountable. 
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Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Gars-
son, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), observed, 291 Fed. 
at 649: 
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every 
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the 
charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his 
defense. He is immune from question or comment on 
his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the 
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. 
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole 
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and 
make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been 
able to see .... Our dangers do not lie in too little 
tenderness to the accused.Our procedure has always 
been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man con-
victed. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear 
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment 
that obstructs, delays and defeats the prosecution of 
crime. 
Consequently, it is manifestly apparent that 
there is no merit to appellant's contention that due 
process of law somehow requires this information. 
Such information was unrelated to the specific 
charge before the Court. The respondent submits 
that the above discussion is responsive to appellants 
points one through four. 
POINT II 
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES ARE ENTRUSTED TO 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
AND THE EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF EQUAL PRO-
TECTION. 
8 
As stated in appellant's brief, this court has de-
nounced as "dangerous" a procedure whereby the 
prosecution would "screen" evidence to be made 
available to the defendant and has held that this 
function is a judicial function to be performed by the 
court. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959). 
The respondent does not question this statement. It 
is incumbent on the court system to protect the 
rights of the accused in all cases. The trial court's 
function is to insure that the defendant is granted 
all the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution and the respective 
state constitutions. Who else is better qualified to 
do so? The respective functions of the prosecutor 
and the court was set out by the Washington Su-
preme Court in State v. Clark, 21 Wash. 2d 77 4, 778, 
153 P.2d 297, 299 (1944): 
A prosecuting attorney is under no obligation to 
submit any evidence he has in his possession to coun-
sel for a person charged with crime .... The state is 
not required to submit its evidence to counsel for the 
accused. The accused is not, as a matter of right, en-
titled to have for inspection before trial evidence 
which is in the possession of the prosecution. Such 
matter is peculiarly within the trial court's discret-
ion, with which we will interfere only when there has 
been a manifest abuse of discretion. [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
The appellant was heard several times in his at-
tempts to gain access to the information held by the 
prosecution (R. 358, 625). Appellant alleges that Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-21-9 (1953) permits him an additional 
discovery device. However, in State v. Lack, 118 Utah 
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128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950), this court observed that a 
bill of particulars was not available as a discovery 
device, stating, 118 Utah at 134: 
Sec. (77-21-9, U.C.A. 1953) was designed to enable 
a defendant to have stated the particulars of the 
charge which he must meet, where the short form of 
indictment or information is used. It was not intended 
as a device to compel the prosecution to give an ac-
cused person a preview of the evidence on which the 
state relies to sustain the charge. 
In State v. Jamison, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173 
(1943), this court stated, 103 Utah at 132: 
He demanded a further bill of particulars showing 
the exact time, the exact place, whether in or out of 
a car, and what other person, if any, was present. The 
court did not err in refusing this request. The purpose 
of a bill of particulars is to inform the defendant of 
the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable 
him to prepare his defense .... The bill of particu-
lars furnished informed him of the nature of the of-
fense, the time and place of its commission, and was 
therefore sufficient. The bill of particulars need not 
plead matters of evidence. 
The trial court found the complaint with the ad-
ditional information supplied by the prosecution to 
be sufficient to apprise the appellant of the nature 
of the accusation. It is uniformly settled that a bill of 
particulars may not be used as a means of gaininq 
information concerning the prosecution's evidence. 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice § 64 (4th ed.); More-
land, Modem Criminal Procedure 213-14 (1958). This 
rule is stated in Annot. 5 A.L.R.2d 444 at 457 (1949): 
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The particulars sought by an accused often are 
such that the furnishing of them would amount to a 
disclosure of the prosecution's evidence. In some in-
stances the demand is obviously an exploratory man-
euver. Except in those cases in which such informa-
tion is essential to the accused in order to enable 
him to prepare for his defense, the courts are not in-
clined to favor the granting of such particulars. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE 
STATE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE CHECK 
PURPORTEDLY UTTERED BY APPELLANT. 
The check on which the information was based 
purports to be one for the payment of money of Pru-
dential Federal Adjusters, with the authorized signa-
ture being "C. Coon" (R. 20). This check has been re-
ferred to as plaintiff's Exhibit 6 in the record (here-
inafter referred to as "P. 6"). A witness for the State 
identified P. 6 as the one appellant cashed at Mak-
off's (R. 303, 342). There is no issue that P. 6 was the 
check on which appellant was given a preliminary 
hearing (R. 624), that P. 6 was the check mentioned 
in the information (R. 624), and that P. 6 was the 
check which appellant was convicted of uttering 
(R. 115). 
The information was amended several times: to 
add middle initial "S." to appellant's name (R. 596); 
to substitute the name of "Carl J. Coon" for that of 
"C. J. McCall" (R. 605); to change the date of the al-
leged uttering from the "8th" to the "11th" day cf 
April (R. 606). In none of these instances did appel-
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lant object to the amending of the information. In 
only one instance did the appellant object to an 
amendment and that objection was denied. The in-
formation showed the alleged event to have oc-
curred in "1965"; the prosecution considered this a 
typographical error and requested it be changed to 
read "1964" (R. 624). At that time appellant admits 
that he had seen a copy of the check in question, 
since he attached a thermofax copy of it to one of 
his motions (R. 624). 
The check mentioned in the information bore the 
name "Cal J. Coon" as the purported maker. Assum-
ing arguendo that the State should have amended 
the information to read "Cal J. Coon," the fact that 
this was not done has not been a denial of appel-
lant's rights under the law. At best, this discrepancy 
would be an immaterial variance and would not con-
stitute reversible error. A mere variance in the let-
ters with which the name of the victim of an offense 
is spelled is not fatal. People v. Gormach, 302 Ill. 332, 
134 N.E. 756 (1922). 
In State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 
( 1937) this court considered the rule of idem sonans 
as applied to forgery and uttering cases. It stated, 
93 Utah at 288: 
We concede it to be well established in criminal pros-
ecutions for forgery that the named charged to be 
forged must be proved as alleged in the indictment or 
information .... It is not essential, however, that 
the names be spelled in the same way, or that they 
be correctly spelled. If substantially the same sound 
is preserved, a variant of orthography will make 
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no difference. The test always is, are the names as 
spelled idem sonans-have the same sound? 
POINT IV 
IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW 
THE STATE TO CALL WITNESSES WHOSE NAMES 
HAD NOT BEEN ENDORSED ON THE INFORMATION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-52 (1953) requires the 
prosecution to list on the face of the information the 
names of witnesses on whose evidence the informa-
tion is based. This is done to allow the defendant 
an opportunity to learn on whose testimony the 
state relied in bringing the charge against the de-
fendant. In the instant case, the four names of the 
witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing 
were so endorsed on the information, thus satisfy-
ing the requirements of the statute. 
The statute continues, " ... the prosecuting at-
torney shall endorse on the information or indict-
ment at such time as the court may rule or otherwise 
prescribe the names of such other witnesses as he 
purposes to call." (Emphasis added.) It is clear, 
therefore, that the statute allows the trial court to de-
termine when and if such names are to be endorsed. 
Since this matter is discretionary with the court, the 
failure to require the naming of prospective wit-
nesses will stand unless the appellate court deter-
mines such actions to be an abuse of discretion. Th·:? 
respondent submits that appellant was not so pre-
judiced as to have required either a new trial or a 
continuance to prepare to meet this testimony. 
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The fact alleged by appellant that the district 
attorney promised to give appellant the names of any 
additional witnesses which might be called and then 
failed to do so was not such as to require a contin-
uance in the interest of justice. The failure to keep 
this pledge may be a matter of faulty memory or 
even poor judgment; however, no case will be re-
versed because of technical errors not amounting 
to a deprivation of substantial justice. State v. Kinq, 
66 Ariz. 42, 182 P.2d 915 (1947). 
POINT V 
IT IS NOT ERROR FOR A TRIAL COURT TO DE-
TERMINE EVIDENCE TO BE ADMISSIBLE FOR ONE 
PURPOSE AFTER PREVIOUSLY RULING SUCH EV-
IDENCE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE. 
The point at issue discussed here concerns the 
right of trial courts to allow evidence on a given sub-
ject to reach the jury after having previously ruled 
the evidence inadmissible when offered for another 
purpose. This could well be characterized as noth-
ing more than a change of the judicial mind or a re-
determination of admissability which would be dis-
cretionary by the court and subject to reversal only 
when there is a showing of manifest injustice which 
results in substantial prejudice to the defendant. 
Here, the evidence in question, the driver's license 
and the check cashed at Albertson's was admitted for 
one purpose, i.e., the establishment of the identity of 
the appellant. It was not admitted to show propensity 
to commit the crime as this court has condemned on 
numerous occasions. As appellant points out in 
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Point IX of his brief, the courts will allow evidence 
of similar incidents when such tends to establish 
the identity of the person charged with the commis-
sion of the crime on trial. People ·v. Harvey. 235 N. Y. 
282, 139 N.E. 268 (1923). That such was the case is not 
in dispute. 
This court has faced this issue in a series of 
criminal cases wherein the accused's history of simi-
lar criminal activity was being used by the prosecu-
tion in an attempt to show a propensity to commit 
the specific crime charged. The court has uniformly 
held this to be error. State v. Neal. 123 Utah 93, 254 
P.2d 1053 (1953); State v. Cooper. 114 Utah 531, 201 
P.2d 764 (1949); State v. Prettyman, 113 Utah 36, 191 
P.2d 142 (1948); State v. Scott. 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 
1016 (1947); State v. Nemier. 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d 
327 (1944). However, the court also held, in State v. 
Willard. 3 Utah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914 (1955), that evi-
dence admissible for one purpose is not inadmis-
sible because it fails to meet requirements for admis-
sibility for another purpose, but the jury should be 
instructed not to use it for the inadmissible purposes. 
See also State v. Green. 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 
(1936). 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
OTHER CHECKS OF THE SAME SERIES, DRAWN ON 
THE SAME BANK ACCOUNT, PAYABLE TO THE 
SAME PAYEE, AND CASHED AT ABOUT THE SAME 
TIME WITH THE SAME IDENTIFICATION TO BE IN-
ADMISSIBLE. 
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At the time of the trial there was no issue before 
the court as to the maker of the check in question. 
The charge of "uttering" concerns itself with the 
passing of the instrument knowing the same to be 
fictitious. This is the only matter to be determined. 
The respondent can see no possible materiality in 
the other checks. The fact remains that only one 
charge was before the court - the utttering of a 
check for the sum of $186.35. It was of no import that 
there were other checks in existence that were near-
ly identical to the check which formed the basis of 
the information. 
The rule that evidence should be confined to 
matters in issue applies to criminal as well as civil 
cases and evidence offered of matters having no 
bearing on questions of fact in issue should be ex-
cluded. State v. Wheeler. 70 Idaho 455, 220 P.2d 687 
(1950). 
What could appellant have proved had other 
checks been admitted? He claims to be able to show 
that the check in question as well as the other checks 
were all endorsed by the same individual. He asserts 
a handwriting analysis would prove that appellant 
did not in fact endorse any of the instruments. This 
reasoning shows the basic error in appellant's case. 
The appellant was charged and convicted of utter-
ing and not of fraudulently endorsing the check. 
Since uttering is complete when one attempts to pass 
16 
a fictitious check, only evidence as to defendant's 
identity and knowledge at the time of the alleged 
passing is relevant. Appellant exercised the right of 
cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecu-
tion to discredit their testimony. The trier of fact 
chose to believe the prosecution witnesses. The ap-
pellate court should not reverse a jury verdict un-
less there is a showing of error so damaging to the 
defendant as to impair justice. 
POINT VII 
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD SEARCH-
ED THIS AREA FOR THE ALLEGEDLY FICTITIOUS 
PERSON WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT NO 
SUCH PERSON EXISTED. 
The appellant made several objections as to the 
foundation laid prior to the officer's testifying of his 
inability to locate anyone in the vicinity of Salt Lake 
County by the name of C. J. Coon, C. Coon, or Carl 
Coon (R. 440), and to the jury instruction respecting 
adequacy of search (R. 589). The officer stated that 
he had checked the local phone book; called up the 
utilities in the valley; called the Secretary of State's 
office; and had checked the city and county direc-
tories for the current year and going back four years 
(R. 440). 
This specific issue was presented to this court 
in State v. Willard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914 (1955), 
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wherein the defendant contended an instruction al-
most identical to that given here (instruction 16) was 
erroneous in limiting the territory within which the 
person by that name must reside or be found. As 
was stated by the court, 3 Utah 2d at 132: 
Under a statute similar to ours, the California courts 
.... held that in a prosecution for issuing a fictitious 
check under such statute proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that no person in the world exists bearing the 
name appended to the check is not required but that 
it is only necessary to prove to a common certainty 
that there is no such person as the one who purport-
edly made such check in the vicinity of the counties 
connected with the act charged. 
The court continued, 3 Utah at 133: 
We further point out that this statute does not re-
quire that there be no person in existence who bears 
the name appended to the check, but it does require 
that there be no person in existence who purportedly, 
or is claimed to have made such check. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The trial court required proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of the nonexistence of the person who 
purportedly made the check. The respondent sub-
mits that this ruling was correct and that it was in 
fact proved to a common certainty. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the jury was convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt. These 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law are not er-
roneous. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
